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INTRODUCTION 

The subject of servitudes, considering both 
its legal and equitable nature, occupies a definitely 
interesting and peculiar position in the vast field of 
law. It is far more comprehensive than would. appear 
at first glance. The subjects to which it has 
reference, and the objects of its action and influence 
are varied and many; yet, the different phases of legal 
history, through which flservitudes fl has passed, have 
treated it with kindness and burdened it with only 
necessary changes in accordance with the advance of 
civilization and its concurrent needs. 
There has been no vast breach of connection 
with the legal past - no sudden and explosive period 
of theorizing and reconstruction. The principles upon 
which the law of servitudes was founded in the early 
periods embracing Roman Law and English Common Law, have 
remained practically intact. The construction of the 
legal foundation was perhaps th e strongest and most 
1. 
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durable of the many legal divisions that we have today~ 
With the exception of widening the scope and relaxing certain 
conditions inconsistent with the modern circumstances, 
the formulators ofthe law of "servitudes" accomplished 
their work with an unusual degree of finesse, and moulded 
it into a permanent structure of the law. The far-seeing 
characteristics associated with these formulators form the 
basis of an undying appreciation on the part of the legal 
profession of today! 
The purpose of this treatise is to trace the 
development, generally, of the law of "servitudes" from 
its early consideration through the different legal systems, 
up to the present period of legal history. 
As previously mentioned, the changes are neither 
great nor many; but a consideration of the application of 
these first, and lasting, principles will prove most 
interesting. This is the method to be fOllowed here. 
Statutory development as evidenced in the code state 
of California will be discussed. At the outset, it will 
be of interest to note that the codification of these 
2. 
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general principles, with a modification of the 
scope of application, constitutes the California law 
on the subject of "servitudes". No drastic changes 
have been offered in this codification - evidence, 
again, of the foresight of the formulators of this 
portion of the law. 
- JTO 'K. ­
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Part I. 
LEGAL SERVITUDES 
An easement is defined as a "ppivilege, liberty, 
or advantage without profit, which the owner of one parcel 
of land may have in the lands of another - or, it is a 
service which one estate owes to another, or a right or 
privilege in one man's estate for the advantage or 
l. 
conveni ence of the owner of another estate!!. 
The essential qualities of easements as enumerated 
by all the authorities are:- First,they ar e incorporeal; 
second, they are imposed upon corporeal property, and not 
upon the owner of it; third, they confer no right to a 
participation in the profits arising from such property; 
fourth, they are imposed for the benefit of corporeal 
property; and fifth, there must be two distinct 
tenements, the dominant to which the right belongs, and 
the servient on which the obligation is imposed. 
A servitude, at civil law, is defined to be a right 
whereby one thing is subject to another thing or person, 
for use or convenience contrary to a common right. 
"Servirzes It may be divided into real and personal. Real 
1. 19 Corpus Juris 862. 
I. 
-
are such as one estate owes unto another estate, as, 
because HI am the owner of such a ground, I have the right 
of way through the ground of another person, or, because 
I am possessed of this house, my neighbor cannot beat out 
a light or window out of his house towards mine, or 
Tbuild his house higher without my leave." 
It ~s the nature of servitudes not to constrain 
anyone to do, but to suffer something. IIHence it may 
be perceived that he whose tenement may be subject to a 
servitude is not, in the common case, bound to perform any 
act for the benefit of the persons or tenement to which 
it is due. His whole burden consists either in being 
restrained from doing, or in being obliged to suffer 
something to be done upon his property by another. In 
the first case, in which the proprietor is barely restrain­
ed from acting, the servitude is called negative, in the 
last positive." 2 
Both terms easements and servitudes are used by 
the common law writers, and often indiscriminately. The 
former, however, is more generally applied to the right 
enjoyed, the latter to the burden imposed. The right of 
1. Erskine Institutes 352. 
2. Erskine Institutes 352 
-2­
.---------------..-/
'-------------------------------------------------- - ---------------­
way, which one man has, as the o~vner of an estate, over 
the land of another, is an easement in the one estate 
and a servitude upon the other. 
!lIn the Civil Law, a servitude, which is but a 
single right of propeJ:>ty, and is called in our law an 
easement, is a bUI'den affecting lands, by '{vhieh the 
propJ:>ietor is restrained from the full use of his 
property, or is obliged to suffer another to do certain 
acts upon it, which, were it not for the burden, would 
be competent solely to the owner". 1 
An easement is a right in one person created by 
grant or its equivalent, to do certain acts on another's 
land or to compel such other to refrain from doing certain 
acts thereon, the right generally existing as an accessory 
to the ownership of neighboring land, and for its 
benefit. 
liThe easements of most importance are:- Rights 
in extension or diminution of natural rights in regard 
to air, water and support; rights of way over another's 
land; rights to maintain aqueducts or drains on another's 
land; rights to have light and air pass to one's windows 
1 Laumier v. Francis 23 Mo. 181 
-3­
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without obstruction; pew rights in churches and burial 
. ht i .. I, 1rlg . s n ceme~erles. 
In primary consideration of the subject of 
easements, it is essential that the differences between 
easements and profits a prendre be pointed out. It is 
notable that all the definitions and descriptions of 
('easement" omit profits or interests in the land 
burdened. This exclusion or omission, which is 
absolutely correct and we ll-founded, is justified in the 
follovling manner: This right of profit a prendre if 
enjoyed by reason of holding a certain other estate, is 
regarded in the light of an easement appurtenant to such 
estate; whereas, if it belongs to an individual, distinct 
from any ownership of other lands, it takes the character 
of an interest in the land itself, rather than that of a 
proper easement in or out of the same. 
As recognized by the respectable weight of 
authori ty - "rights of accomrnodatlon in another's land, 
as distinguished from those which are directly profitable, 
2 
are properly called easements ir . 
This distinctj.on was substantially pointed out 
in the early New York case of Pierce v. Keaton, decided 
in 1877. In that case plaintiff's intestate, owning a 
1. Modern Law of Real Property. Tiffany, p. 677 
2. Burton on Real Property #1165 
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farm, granted a strip of it to the N.Y. & O.M. RH. 
Company, reserving to himself the privilege of mowing 
and cultivating the surplus ground of the strip not 
required for railroad purposes. The deed contained this 
reservation - ItSaid parties of the first part also to 
have the privilege of mowing and cultivating the surplus 
ground of said strip of land not required for railroad 
purposes". At the time of the conveyance there was a 
mortgage on the farm, which was subsequently foreclosed. 
The deed given upon the foreclosure sale excepted the strip 
of land so conveyed, stating that it "is reserved as con­
veyed to said O. & M RR. Co. defendants who succeeded!I . 
to the title of the purchaser, entered upon the railroad 
land and cut and removed wheat growing thereon. In an 
action of trespass it was held that the reservation in 
the deed to the railroad company was not an easement 
appurtenant to the remaining portion of the farm, but a 
right to profits in the land conveyed reserved to the 
grantors Eersonally, ,not as owners of or for the 
benefit of the farm; that such right therefore did not 
pass by the deed on foreclosure sale; and that defendants 
-5­
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1 
were liable. 
Quoting f :c~om this same cas e, which provides an 
excellent discussion exemplifying the distinction between 
an easement and profits a prendre: "The term 'easement' 
has sometimes been applied to rights in or over land without 
strict regard to the recognized distinctions between the 
different kind or class of rights. These distinctions 
may be impaired and even obliterated by the circumstances 
attending, and the manner of their creation. An easement 
is a liberty, privilege or advantage in land without profit, 
existing distinct from the ownership of the soil. 
liThe right to profits, denominated profit a prendre, 
consists of a right to take a part of the soil or produce 
of the land, in which there is a supposable value. It is 
in its nature corporeal, and is capable of livery, which 
easements are not, and may exist independently without 
connection with or being appendant to other property." 
"As the terms of the reservation indicate, a personal 
privilege and as there is nothing in the nature of the 
right reserved connecting it in any manner with the ownership 
or use of the remainder of the farm, there seems no alternati ve 
but to apply the established rules and recognized legal 
1 Pierce v. Keaton 70 N.Y. 419 
-6­
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distinctions to the transaction - for a profit a 
prendre in the land of another, when not granted in 
favor of some dominant tenement, carLYlot be said to be 
an easement, but an interest or estate in the land 
1itself. fl 
Another important distinction which is 
necessary to the proper application of the doctrines 
concerning easements, is found in the differences 
between an easement and a license. An easement always 
implies an interest in the land in or over which it 
is enjoyed. A license carries no such interest. The 
interest of an easement may be a freehold or a chattel 
one, according to its duration: whereas, whatever 
right one has in another's land by license may~ as a 
general proposition, be said to be revocable at will 
by the owner of the land in which it is to be enjoyed. 
An easement must be an interest in or over the 
soil. It lies not in livery, but in grant, and a 
freehold interest in it cannot be created or passed 
otherwise than by deed. 
This distinction between a license and an ease­
ment may be illustrated by the effect given to a con­
1. N. Y. 419 (421 et se~. · ) . 
-7­
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veyance of the land or over which it is to be enjoyed. 
A conveyance of land by the grantor, who has given a parol 
license to another to enjoy a right in the nature of an 
easement in it, ipso facto, determines the license; 
whereas whosoever takes an estate upon which a servitude 
has been imposed, holds it subject to the same servitude, 
and in the same manner as it was held by his grantor. 
To illustrate:- If the grant be a personal 
license of pleasure, it extends only to the individual 
and is not to be exercised by or with servants - but if it 
be a license for profit, and not for pleasure, it may. 
(The case subject to this reference was of a license to 
hunt, and as it included the right to kill and take with 
him the deer at his pleasure, it was held a license to 
go on with his servants, or send them to hunt; whereas, 
if it were a mere license to hunt at his pleasure, he 
cannot take away the game, nor go with servants, nor 
1
assign his license to another.) 
In classifying servitudes, the civil law recog­
nized a much more minute subdivision of the various forms 
they assumed than those in use in the common law, 
1 Duchess of Norfolk v. Wiseman-? Meeson & Welbsy (Eng)?7 
-8­
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although the latter has borrowed liberally from the 
former. 
That class of servitudes, which we treat of here, 
waE called Predial, lands and tenements, being such 
services as one estate owes to another. These were again 
divided into rural and urban, the one relating- to land 
not occupied by buildings, the other affecting bUildings, 
whether in a city proper, a villa or in the country. 
Among the rural services was the right of passing over 
the land of another, which took various names of Iter, 
Actus, and Via, according to the extent and mode of using 
the same; the right of bringing water through another's 
land, called Aquae ductus, when done by pipe or rivulet; 
Fishing, drawing water, hunting, watering cattle, etc.; 
all these were what were called Affirmative Services. 
The urban services were either affirmative or 
negative. Among the affirmative urban services were the 
right to rest the wall of a house for its support a.gainst 
that of another, and to require the owner of the latter 
to keep the same in repair; the right to extend a balcony 
over the land of another; a right to have a sink or 
-9­
gutter. through a neighbor's house, to construct what 
lights or windows he chooses against the estate of another; 
to have a clear and pleasant prospect from one's house 
over another's court or yard, etc. 
Among the negative services of an urban character 
were that one's neighbor should not turn the droppings 
of the eaves of his house upon the house or ground of 
him who has the servitude; that he should not darken 
his windows; or hinder his prospect by building or by 
planting trees, etc. 
The description and enumeration of the 
servitudes known to the French law were made known by 
means of certain articles in the Code Napoleon. These 
included - First, such as arise from the situation of 
places, as the rights of the owners of adjacent lands 
in respect to the waters upon the one passing on or 
across the other, the boundaries of adjacent lands, and 
the like. Second, such .as are created by law, that is, 
party walls and ditches between two estates, and party 
or division hedges dividing lands, servitudes of view 
over a neighbor's property, and those of eaves of roofs 
-IQ­
~----~-------------------------------------------------------------~~ 
and of ways answering to ways of necessity at common law. 
Third, servitudes created by the act of man, which are 
divided into urban and rural, answering to a like division 
in the civil law, servitudes continual and continuable, 
and the servitudes apparent and non-apparent. 
As a transition, it may properly be said that the 
classification (or a great many of the classifications) 
of easements in the Code of France are recognized by the 
courts of the common law, as for instance, that of COl1­
tinuous and discontinuous which are thus defined: 
"Continuous are those of which the enjoyment is or may be 
continual, without the necessity of any actual interference 
by man, as a waterspout or a right of light or air. Dis­
continuous are those the enjoyment of which can be had 
only by the interference of man, as ±:lights of way, or a 
1
right to draw water." 
Likewise, in the classification as to affirmative 
and negative easements, we find that in affirmative 
easements the servient tenement nmst permit some act to be 
done thereon by the owner of the dominant estate, such as 
passing over it as a way, discharging water upon it from 
1 Lampman v. Milks 21 N.Y. 505 
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a channel or spout or eaves of his house. 
In negative easements, the owner of the servient 
estate is prohibited from doing something on his own land 
which he otherwise might do, such as not building upon 
the same, whereby so doing he obstructs the light and air 
from reaching the dominant estate, or not digging in his 
soil so as to weaken the foundation of the house standing 
on the dominant estate. 
A leading case on this subject of negative easements 
is found in Pitkin v. Long Island RR. Company. The RR. 
Company entered into an agreement, or at least an 
obligation, to stop their trains at a particular place 
adjoining his property. In substance, the court held it 
to be an easement or servitude, binding upon the property 
of the company, and an interest in their land in favor of 
1the landowner. 
The landowner in such case had a negative easement 
in the property of the RH. Company, whel"eby he might 
restrict them, as owners of a servient tenement, in the 
exercise of general and natural rights of property, so 
as to compel them to use it in a particular way, by kee~ing 
1 Pitkin v. Long Island RR. Co. 2 Barb. Ch. 221, 231. 
-12­
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certain erections thereon, and stopping their trains at 
a particular place for his use and benefit as the owner 
of the adj acent land, Yvhich thus became the dominant 
tenement. 
Following along the same lines, there is another 
interesting decision .rendered by the Supreme Court of 
Vermont in 1870. I have reference to the Claremont Bridge 
Company v. Royce. In this case a bridge corporation owned 
a toll-bridge across a river, and to prevent persons 
avoiding the payment of tolls, in crossing the river, the 
corporation purchased of a land-owner adjoining their 
bridge and the river, a right to use it as a way to the 
river. On these facts the court held, that the right 
claimed was a proper subject of grant, and under it the 
corporation could stop persons traveling ac~oss this land, 
and maintain an action against anyone who knowingly crossed 
1 
t i':. is land. 
An easement or servitude is a definite right, and 
an injury to it, like the violation of any right, must 
be compensated. The protection of the law is every bit 
as prominent in this class of cases, as well as in other 
I Claremont Bridge Company v. Royce 42 Vermont 730. 
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divisions of legal rights. Hence, if the owner of the 
servient estate does anything to obstruct, interfere with, 
or impair the enjoyment of an easement therein, the 
owner of the dominant estate may maintain an acti on 
therefor, even though he may not be able to prove any 
injury and actual loss to have been occasioned thereby; 
because a repetition of such acts might ripen into an 
adverse right. 
As to what will constitute an adverse enjoyn:ent 
sufficient to give one party e.n easement in another's 
l8nd, the authority all tends to the proposition, that ­
it TIUlst be had ...,lhi1e there is someone to whom such use 
is adver~e. It must be open, such as the owner is pre­
smned to be cogni.7.ant of. If steal tbj.:l~T done, it would 
not give a right. But it is no objection that the user 
began in trespass. 
However, eVen though no actual damage can be 
shown by the obstruction or interference in the easement 
by the owner of the dominant estate, the law in such 
cases will presume a damage, in order to enable the party 
to vindicate his right. Or the owner of the dominant 
-------
estate may enter upon the servient e s tate and remove any 
obstructlon wrongfully placed there to the detriment 
of his easement in t he same. If these are cl?eated by 
the owner of the servient tenement, the one entitled to 
such easement may make such entry without any previous 
request to have them removed. But if erected by a 
stranger, or by the grantor of the owner of the servient 
estate, it seems that there should be 8 prior request. 
So, if the effect of an act done on the servient estate 
will be to create a nuisance, the owner of the dominant 
estate ne ed not wait till some actual injury has been 
suffered. And he may, ·where his tl tIe is clear, have an 
injunction to restrain a nuisance to the enjoyment of 
his easement. 
In t his latter case of nuis ances, and their 
injunction, the usual rules pertaining to the issuing 
of injunctions apply with equal force. As, for example, 
in the case of McMaugh v. Burke it was held that if the 
t hreatened damage is likely to be slight, the court will 
not enjoin, but leave the owner of the easement to proceed 
1 
at law. 
1 McMaugh v. Burke 12 R. I. 499. 
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An ea~ement, irrespective of the manner in which 
it has been acquired, can be extinguished only in some manner 
or mode recognized by law. 
There are several generally recognized modes of 
termination of easements - known and upheld universally 
throughout the United states, in jurisdictions embracing 
both the common law, and statute, and in almost the same 
form r~cognized in the earlier systems of the law with 
which we are concerning ourselves in this thesis. 
First, Abandorunent. A party entitled to a right 
of way, or other mere easement in the land of another may 
abandon and extinguish such right by acts in paiS, and 
without deed or other instrument in writing. This he may 
do without responsibility of any sort, and without con­
sulting the grantor where the easement was created by 
grant. Ordinarily, the questlon of abandonment is purely 
one of intention. This was capably exemplified in the 
case of Snell v. Levitt in the following words: "Nothing 
short of an intention to abandon the right to an easement 
will operate to that effect, when other persons have not 
been led by acts to treat the servient estate as free of 
-16­
the servitude and where the easement can be resumed 
without doing an injury to their rights in respect to 
1it. fl 
flAn easement acquired by grant cannot be lost by non­
user alone, but must be accompanied with an intention; 
2 
expressed or implied, of abandonment." 
The acts relied on as evidencing this intent' to abandon 
must be of an unequivocal and decisive character. Whether 
a party has abandoned his right to an easement is a question 
of fact for the determination of the jury, and is never a 
question of law for the court to determine. 
Notwithstanding the small minority of decisions to the 
contrary, it has been universally held, except where other­
wise provided by statute or by the deed itself, that mere 
nonuser of an easement created by a deed for a period however 
long will not amount to an abandonment. 
liTo extinguish an easement acquired by grant the non­
user must be accompanied with an expressed or implied 
intentlon of abandonment and the owner of the servient 
estate, acting upon the intention of abandonment and the 
actual nonuser, must have incurred expenses on his ovvn 
1 Snell v. Levitt - 110 N. Y. 595. 

2 People v. Southern Pacific Company, 172 Cal. 692. 
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estate. The three elements, nonuser, intention to 
abandon, and damage to the owner of the servient estate 
must concur in order to extinguish the easement.1t 1 
"The rule that a grantee will not be permitted to 
resume an easement granted, 1vhere his acts have led other 
persons to treat the servient estate as free from the 
servitude, does not apply where no one has been mislead 
2to his prejudice by the acts of such grantee." 
"While a right of way may be lost by abandon.ment, non­
user is only one of the elements of proof from which such 
abandonment can be inferred. The real question to be 
3determined is the intention of the owner of the right." 
An interesting discussion of the intention to abandon 
is found in the California case of Cohn v. San Pedro, etc; 
there, the railroad company sought to buy the land it was 
using under eminent domain, and aQmitted to the plaintiff, 
that he was the owner of the land. Plaintiff having refused 
to sell, the railro&td continued to use it under the eminent 
domain proceedings; plaintiff claiming that this evidenced 
an intention to abandon. The court held: TlTbe fact that, 
after defendant railroad company moved its tracks and yard 
I Smith v. Worn, 93 Cal. 206. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ocean Shore RR. Company 'g. Spring Valley V\iater Company, 
87 Cal. App. 188. 
-18­
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from the immediate vicinity of the land in question, the 
general manager of defendant r a ilroad company called u pon 
plaintiff and admitted plain tif f was the owner of the lot, 
and offered to purchase the property from the plaintiff, did 
not evidence an intention to abandon on the part of the 
defendant, where plaintiff refused to sell and as a result 
thereof the defendant continued using the property for the 
purpose for which it was dedicated under t~e eminent domain 
1. 
proceedings. rT 
In gen eral, it may be said t h at the cases are at a 
distinct variance on t he question of nonuser as an abandon­
ment - that is, nonuser standing practically alone. 
(California decis i ons point to the conclusion that the law 
is settled in tb~s particular field in this state.) The 
general authority, however, le ans to the principle t h at, 
mere nonuser, unless for the prescriptive period, wi.ll :Daise 
no presumption of abandoIilment - this, of course, is in the 
absence of special statutory regulation on the nonuser 
question. 
Second, Noncompliance with conditions. A failure to 
comply substantially with the condit i ons (imposed u pon the 
1 Cohn v. San Pedro, 1. A. & s. L. Co. 103 Cal. App. 496. 
-19­
grantee as the consideration for the easement) may operate 
to work a forfeiture of the easement, unless, as is per­
missible, there is a waiver of performance of the con­
ditions. Where an easement has been forfeited by con-compliance 
vvith the condition imposed by the instrl.:unent creating it 
and by notice of the election to forfeit it, the easement 
is not restored by a subsequent compliance with the con­
dition without the consent and against the protest of the 
owner of the servient tenement. 
Third, Merger by unity of title. An owner of land 
cannot have an easement in his own estate in fee, for the 
obvious reason that in having the full and unlimited right 
and power to make any and every possible use of the land, 
all subordinate and inferior derivative rights are 
necessarily merged and lost in the higher right. 
TlA servitude camlOt be held by the owner of the 
servient tenement; and the vesting of the right to the 
servitude and the right to the servient tenement in the same 
person extinguishes the servitude by merger of the estates.lI 
In reference to what quantum of title-unity is 
necessary before there is extinguishJnent by merger of 
1 Drake v. Russian River Land Company, 10 Cal. App. 654. 
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estates, the California Supreme Court has settled on the 
following characteristics, which appear to reflect the 
general consensus of American au thority in this respect: 
"I n order that unity of ti tle to two estates should extin­
guish an existing easement, the ownership of the two estates 
should be coextensive, equal in validity, quality and all 
other characteristics." 1 
Fourth, Act of God or Operation of Law. Where an 
easement is granted to a particular person t o be enjoyed 
during the continuance of eertain conditions, it is 
extinguished whenever these conditions cease to exist. 
Fifth, Severance and Partition. An easement is not 
extinguished by a division of the estate to which it is 
appurtenant, but the ovmer or assignee of any portion of 
that estate may claim the right so far as it is applicable 
to his part of the property, provided the right can be 
enjoyed as to the separate parcels without any additional 
burden upon the servient estate. 
Sixth, Release, Agreement or License. The owner of 
an easement may release the right to the owner of the 
servient estate by deed. Like"wise, an easement acquired 
1 Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7. 
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by adverse use will not be defeated by obtaining a license 
for its further enjoyment, although the application for 
such a license is evidence that the former use was no 
adverse but permissive. A parol agreement between the owners 
of the dominant and servient estates may operate to ex­
tinguish an easement whethe r created by grant or prescription, 
where such agreement has been ex ecuted by the owner of the 
servient estate. 
Seventh, Alterations and obstruction s inconsistent 
with the easement. While an obstruction by a mere trespasser 
will not operate to extinguish an easement, yet if the owner 
of the easement by hisown act renders t h e use of the easement 
impossible, or himself obstructs it in a manner inconsistent 
with its further enjoyment, or p e r mits the owner of the 
servient estate to do so, the e asemen t will be considered 
as abandoned. But to cons ti tutesuch an abandonment the 
acts relied on raust be of a decisive and conclusive c haracter. 
-22­
Eighth, Change of location of way. The right of an 
individual to a passway when properly acquired by prescriptive 
use i:s not lost by slight changes which make little 
difference in the passway or its use, but it is otherwise 
where a new passway, without closing the old and long-used 
one, is opened leading from it, having new termini and a 
wholly different course. 
Touching on t h is point, the case of Ricioli v. Lynch, 
a decision of the Supreme Court of California, stated: "A 
tenant of plaintiff and a tenant of defendants, with the 
permission and consent of defendants, having changed the 
course of the road for a distance of about t wo hundred yards 
to avoid a steep hill, such change did not 8.ffect plaintiff's 
1
right to use the road, including the new section." 
Ninth, Cessation of purpose or neces s ity. A way of 
necessity ceases as soon as the necessity to use it ceases. 
Likev7ise, if an easement is granted for a particular purpose 
t be right terminates as soon as the purpose for which it was 
granted ceases to exist. 
!fA right of way from necessity only continues while 
the necessity exists. !! 2 
- ---- - ---.---­
1 Ricioli v. Lynch, 65 Cal. App. 63. 
2 Kripp v. Curtis, 71 Cal. 62. 
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"The necessity ceases when another way has been 
acquired, or when, by the acquisition of othe r lands, the 
owner can reach the public road without traversing the land 
of others.1I 
irA way of necessity cannot be extinguished so long as 
the necessity exists, and must be presumed to continue, 
unless some fact found by the court shows that the right no 
longer exists; and a finding that a road used across plaintiff's 
land by special agreement, without stating what the agreement 
was, is not inconsistent with t h e continuance of the way of 
necessity. 1t 1 
Tenth, Removal or destruction of servient tenement. 
Removal or destruction of the servient tenement may extin­
guish the easement. Howeve r , an easement may survive a 
partial destruction of the servient tenement, if t h ere is 
anything remaining u pon which t h e dominant tenement can 
operate. 
That California is definitely in accord with this general 
principle, will be evidenced by the fmllOi~Jing: "A right i n 
the nature of an easement, as it is sometimes called, is 
extinguished by the destruction of the building, or the part 
-------------_.--/ 
1 Blum v. Weston, 102 Cal. 367. 
-...-.'. 
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thereof upon which the eaSeT'lent is imposed, so that there 
is nothing upon which it can operate." •••• "A grant of 
the right to use the stairway of a building gives no interest 
in the soil which will survive the destruction of the 
building, and the right ceases whenever the building is 
destroyed without the fault of the owner of the servient 
tenement, and the owner of the right to use the stairway 
will not acquire any right in any new building which may be 
1 
erected in the place of the one destroyed." 
Eleventh, Forfeiture for misuser. The right to an 
easement is not lost by using it in an unauthorized manner, 
or to an unauthorized extent, unless it is impossible to 
sever the increased burden so as to preserve .to the owner of 
the dominant tenement that to '.'ihich he is entitled, and to 
i mpose upon the servient tenement only that burden which was 
originally imposed upon it without the obligation attempted 
to be imposed up on it by alterations. The rule is especially 
applicable where the servitude is not materially increased. 
~velfth, Recovery of_~amage for invasion of easement. 
The recovery of damages for the invasion of an easement does 
not operate either before or after satisfaction of the 
1 Muzio v. Erickson, 41 Cal. App. 413. 
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judgment as an extinguismaent of the easement. It is merely 
an indemnity for a past wrong leaving unaffected the right 
to the easement. 
Thirteenth, Adverse possession. The right to an 
easement may be lost by an occupation on the part of the 
servient owner adverse to, and inconsistent with, the non­
user by the owner of the ease~ent, if such occupation 
extends over the statutory period, and is continuous; but 
the right will not be lost where t he occupation is not 
clearly adverse, nor where it is not continued for the period 
pr~scribed by statute. 
"While the mere nonuser of an easemen t acquired by 
grant for any period of time will not if its elf operate to 
ext ttnguish it, yet when such nonuser is ' coupled with an 
actual and physical interference with its exercise and with 
an adverse possession of the servient tenement for the period 
pr escribed by law, the easement will be extinguished by the 
statute of limitatio~ 1If 
Fourteenth, Dedication or appropriation to public use. 
The right to an easement will be extinguished by a lawful 
appropriation to a public use of the land which will render 
1 City and County of San Francisco v. Main-23 Cal. App . 86. 
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the enjoyment of the easement impossible. 
Fifteenth, Est?J?.J2.~h The right to an easement may be 
lost by estoppel. 
Sixteenth, Revival of lost right. Where an easement 
is once extinguished the right is forever gone and cannot 
be revived, and the use can be reestablished only by the 
acquisi tion of a nei;"iT title; but if the right is merely 
suspended it may be revived. 
trWhen the owner of an easement licenses another to do 
an act which affects the enjoyment of the easement, when the 
license is revoked, the right to the easement revives with 
full vigor. 1t 1 
This concludes the general discussion as to the methods 
recognized in the majority of jurisdiction of extinguishing 
easements. It will be noticed that California recognizes, 
by statute and accompanying decision, only four or fj.ve of 
the sixteen methods set forth. But these recognized methods 
are of a general nature and embrace many of the others 
specifically pointed out. 
The California statutes have expiliicitly and definitely 
set out all the matter embraced in the general subject of 
1 Keller v. City of Oak land, 54 Cal. App . 169 
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"servitudes. II By reason of Sectlon 801 of the Civil Code, 
there is no doubt left as to what are servitudes or ease­
ments in this jurisdiction: 
"The following land burdens, or servitudes upon land, 
may 	 be attached to other land as incidents or appurtenances, 
and 	are then called easements: 
1. 	 The right of pasture; 
2. 	 The right of fishing; 
3. 	 The right of taking game; 
4. 	 The right of way; 
5. 	 The right of taking water, minerals and other things; 
6. 	 The right of transacting business on land; 
7. 	 The right of conducting la"wful sports upon land; 
8. 	 The rigbt of receiving air, light or heat from or over, or 

discharging the sru,1e upon or over la~d; 

9. 	 The right of receiving water from or discharging the same 

upon land; 

10. 	 The right of flooding land; 
11. 	 The right of having water flow without diminution or 
disturbance of any kind; 
12. 	 The right of using a wall as a party-wall; 
13. 	 The right of receiving more than natural support from 
adjacent land or things affixed thereon; 
14. 	 The right of having the whole of a division fence main­
tained by a coterminous owner; 
15. 	 The right of having public conveyance stopped, or of 
stopping the same on land; 
16. 	 The right of a se a t in church; 
17. 	 The right of burial." 1 
"The follo wing land burdens, or servitudes upon land, 
may be granted and held, though not attached to land: 
One. The right to pasture and of fishing and taking game. 
Two. The right of a seat in church. 
T~ee. The right of burial. 
Four. The right of taking rents and tolls. 
Five , The right of way_ 
Six. The right of taking water, wood, minerals or other things." 2. 
1 
2 
Cal. Civil Code, 
Ibid 802. 
801. 
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In view of these two sections, California is seen to 
have divided easements, or servitudes, (the terms being used 
interchangeably), into t wo main classes - servitudes attach ed 
to land, and servitudes not attached to land. This con­
stitutes California's statutory embodyment of the common law 
division of "easements a ppurtenant and in gross." 
Another change wrought by codification of easement law 
in this state is found in the fact that there is a distinct 
difference'between easements and profits a prendre at common 
law, while under our code the difference is not at all pro­
nounced •.•• it is considered as very similar, even to the extent 
that the code includes at least one common law class of profit 
a prendre (right of taking minerals) in its classification 
of easements. 
The code likewise provides the follo wing succinct state­
ment of law, which will be wholly sufficient in itself without 
any further elaboration:­
"A servitude can be created only by one who has a vested 
estate in the servient tenement." 1 
"The extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of 
the grant~ or the nature of the enjoyraent by which it was 
qcquired.' 2 
1 Cal. Civil Code 804. 

2 Ibid 806. 
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"In case of partition of the dominant tenement the 
burden must be apportioned according to the division of the 
dominant tenement, but not in such a way as to increase the 
burden upon the servient tenement." 1 
rtThe O1.'ffier of a future estate in a dominant tenement 
may use easements attached thereto for the purpose of 
viewing waste, demanding rent, or removing an obstruction 
to the enjoyment of such easements, although such tenement 
is occupied by a tenant." 2 . 
"The owner of any estate in a dominant tenement, or 
the occupant of such tenement, may maintain an action for 
the enforcement of an easement attached thereto." 3 
TIThe owner in fee of a servient tenement may maintain 
an action for the possession of the land, against anyone 
unlawfully possessed tbereof, though a servitude exists 
thereon in favor of the public. It 4 
"A servitude is extinguished: 
1. By the vesting of the right to the servitude and right 
to the servient tenement in the same person; 
2. By the destruction of the servienL tenement; 
3. By the performance of any act upon either tenement, by 
the owner of the servitude, or-wIth his assent, which is 
incompatible with its nature or exercise; or, 
4. \n1.en the servitude was acquired by enjoyment, by disuse 
t hereof by the owner of the servitude for the period pre­
scribed for acquiring title by enjoyment.1t 5. 
The portion to be noted in conn.ec t ion with the ext in­
guishment of an easement, under subdivision four of the 
last section referred to, is that "this method of extin­
guishment does not apply to easements founded upon a grant. 
1 Ibid 807 3 Ibid 809 
2 Ibid 808 4 Ibid 810 
5 Ibid 811 
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The latter cannot be lost by mere nonuser for any length 
of time, no matter how great." 1 
The distinctions drawn between easements and licenses, 
and profits a prendre, of necessity d emand more than a mere 
mention of covenants running with the land. The latter 
division is allied with easements in nature and mode of 
transfer and respecting assignment and will be considered 
at this point of development, only with respect to that 
aRliance. 
Covenants in general are divided into express and 
imulied. Express covenants are further divided into 
2. 
personal covenants, and thos,e that run wi th the land. 
Covenants 17lhich may be enforced by the assignee of 
the term or of the reversion are said to run with the land. 
If a covenant touches or concerns the thing demised and there 
is privity of estate between the parties, it runs with 
the land. 
In this respect, Morse v. Aldrich, decided in 1837, 
is expressive of the weight of authority. tlOne C. conveyed 
to the plaintiff's grantor, in fee, a parcel of land, 
including a portion of C's mill pond, with liberty of ingress 
1 9 Cal. Juris. -961. 

2 Real Property, Hopkins. (Hornbook series) p. 134; 
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and egress to and from any part of the described land and 
water to dig out and carry a'Nay the whole or any part of 
the soil. After the same granted premises had been con­
veyed to the plaintiff an agreement was between C., and the 
plaintiff, in which C. covenanted (without mentioning 
his heirs or assigns), that he would, upon the plaintiff's 
request, draw off his pond six days a year, in August and 
September, for the purpose of giving the plaintiff an 
oP:9ortn nity of digging and carrying out mud. C. died and 
his estate in the mill pond descended to defendants. In 
an action by the plaintiff against the defendants, on 
this covenant, it was held that there was a privity of 
estate between the parties and that the covenant ran with 
the land." 
"This is a covenant real and runs with the land. 
Two things are requisite to such a covenant; first, it 
must have for its object something concerning the realty; 
and secondly, there must be a privity of estate as 
between the covenantor and covenantee. 1I 1 
The covenants of title regarded as real or running 
with the land, are those against incumbrances of general 
1 Morse v. Aldrich - 19 Pickering (Mass) 449, 451. 
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warranty, and for quiet enjoyment. As covenants running 
with the land affect some interest in or concerned with the 
title to real estate, it is clear that such covenants may 
be of almost infinite variety. 
Among covenants running with land are all implied 
covenants; all covenants for quiet enjo~~nent; covenants 
in general relating to leases; fences; party-walls; 
rights of way; streets; covenants relating to the construct­
ion of dams or canals, and contracts as to furnishing 
water; covenants to pay rent; to insure; to repair, or to 
deliver up in good condition; to reside on the premises; 
or, to pay taxes ••• also, covenants creating easements 
and servitudes generally. 
Real covenants are, of course, sometimes 
de s ignat ed by statute although where so designated such 
covenants may not be strictly confined to those 
specifically named , but other covenants by reason of their 
character may be included within the meaning of such 
statutes as also running viTi th t he land. 
This is the case in California, as evidenced by the 
following Code provision: 
-33­
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"The only covenants which run ,.'lith the land are 
those specified in this title, and those which are 
incidental thereto." 1 
"gertain covenants, contained in grants of estates 
in real property, are appurtenant to such estates, and 
pass with them, so as to bind the assigns of the covenantor 
and to vest in the assigns of the covenantee, in the same 
manner as if they had personally entered into them. Such 
covenants are said to run with the land." 2 
This necessarily intruduces us to the question - what, 
then, does the Code provide mn "this title" as being 
covenants running with the land? The query is specifically 
answered in the follo'wing provis ions:­
"~very covenant contained in a grant of an estate 
in real property, which is made for the direct benefit 
of the property, or some part of it then in existence, 
runs with the land. 1t 3 
liThe last section includes covenants tf 6f warranty " 
for quiet enjoyment" or for further assurance on the part 
of the grantor, and covenants for the payment of rent, 
or of taxes or assessments upon the land, on the part of 
a grantee. It 4 
"A covenant for the addition of some new thing to 
real property, or for the direct benefit of some part 
of the property not then in existence or annexed thereto, 
when contained in a grant of an estate in such property, 
and made by the covenantor expressly for his assigns 
or to the assigns of the covenantee, runs with land so 
far only as the assigns thus mentioned are concerned." 5 
"A covenant running vvith the land binds those only 
who acquire the whole estate of the covenantor in some 
part of the property.1f 6 
"A covenant made by the owner of land with the owner 
of other land to do or refrain from doing some act on 
his own land, which doing or refraining is expressed to be 
for the benefit of the land of the covenantee, and which is 
made by the covenantor expressly for his assigns or to the 
assigns of the covenantee, runs with both of such parcels 
1 
2 
Cal. Civil Code,
Ibid 1460 1461 3 4 Cal. Ibid Civil Code 1463 1462 5 6 Ibid 1464 Ibid 1465 
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of land. II 1 
Referring back again to the weight of authority in 
America, covenants in a lease relating to the thing demised 
run with the land even though the covenant does not, in 
certain instances, have reference to something to be done 
on the land itself. But if the thing to be done is 
collateral to the land, and does not touch or concern 
the thing demised, then the covenant is personal, and the 
assignee is not charged though named in the covenant. In 
accordance with the gene~al rule, real covenants include 
covenants to pay rent, to insure, to build houses on the 
land demised, to pay for improvements, to make repairs, 
or share in such expense, to renew a lease, etc. 
"A covenant in a lease to the lessee, tlhis heirs and 
assigns ", for a term of eight years, that if tt_e lessor 
should sell or dispose of the demised premises the lessee 
is to be entitled to a refusal of the sa.me, is a 'covenant 
running with the land. 1I ... . 
"Every covenant in the lease relating to the thing 
demised, attaches to the land, and runs with it.tt 2 
Following the rule that the intention is the 
1 Ibid 1460. 

2 Laffan v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 662. 
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cardinal principle of interpretation of covenants, as 
indication by the parties of t heir intention to bind sub­
sequent holders of the property is necess ary to the 
running of an agreement; otherwise it will be deemed per­
sonal. But a failure to state that the covenant is to 
run with the land is immaterial where the intention of 
the parties can be' gathered from the instrument. The better 
authority of the United states holds that a party-wall 
agreement is in the nature of a covenant running with the 
land. And so an obligation to contribute to the cost of a 
party-wall or to pay for the use of a party-wall is a 
covenant running with the land, and the right to recover 
t he sum agreed upon passes to the grantee of the original 
builder under his de ed. 
In general, however, the point to remember is Simply, 
that the pl"'evailing American doctrine is to the effect 
that any deed transferring title, passes to the grantee 
the benefit of a covenant that runs with the land. 
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Part II 

EQUITABLE SERVITUDES 

The COlIL'TIOn La1:v recognized eas ements, profits 
a prendre, and covenants running with the land. To these 
equity has added a fourth category. In the classical 
sense, the equitable servitude was created by a covenant, 
but the decisive point was· the declared intention of the 
parties, not the form in which it was declared. 
At law, profits and easements can be created only 
by dee d or by adverse user, and in order t hat a covenant 
run with the land it must be a formal covenant. Equity, 
on the other hand, here as elsewhere, look s to the substance 
rather than to the form, and the substance is declared 
intention. 
To use the language of Bigelow, C.J., in Whitney v. 
Union Ry. Co., . equitable easements would fall properly 
within this definition: itA right, without profit, which 
the owner of land has acquired , by contract, or estoppel, 
to restrict or regulate, for the benefit of his own 
property, the use and enjoyment of the land of another. " 1 
1 Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. 77 Ma s s. 359. 
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The purpose of inserting restrictions in deeds is 
manifestly to prevent such a use of the premises by the 
grantee and those claiming unde r him, as might diminish 
t h e value of the residue of the land belonging to the 
grantor , or impair its eligibility as sites for private 
residences. That such purpose is a leg itimate one, and may 
be carried out, consistently with the rules of law, by 
reasonable and prope r covenants, conditions or restrictions, 
cannot be doubt ed. 
Every owner of real property has the right to deal 
with it, as to restrain its use by his grantees within such 
limits as to prevent its a ppropriation to purposes which 
will i mp a ir t h e value or diminish the pleasure of the 
enjoyment of the land 1Jvhlch h e retains. The only restriction 
in this right is, with a due re gard to public policy, and 
vITi thout creating an unlawful restraint on trade. 
The question is, to what extent and in what cases are 
such stipulations binding on those who take the estate 
under the grantee, directly, or by a derivative title? 
Upon this point the better opinion would seem to be that 
such agre ements are valid, and capably of being enforced 
in equity against all those who tak e the estate with 
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notice of them, although they may not be strictly speaking, 
real 60venants, so as to run with the land, or of a nature 
to create a technical qualificatlon of the title conveyed 
by the deed. Thls opinlon rests on the princlple that, as 
in equity that which is agreed to be done shall be consider­
ed as performed, a purchaser of land, with notlce of a 
right or interest in it, subsisting in another, is liable 
to the same extent and in the same manner as the person 
from whom he made the purchase, and is bound to do that which 
his vendor agreed to perform. Therefore, an agreement or 
covenant, though merely personal in its nature, and not 
purporting to bind assignees, will nevertheless be enforced 
against them, unless they have a higher and better right in 
equity as bona fide purchasers without notice. It is on 
this ground, that a purcbaser of an estate, taking it with 
notice of a prior agreement by the vendor to sell it to 
another, can be compelled in equity to convey it according 
to such agreement o 
In like manner, by taking an estate from a grantor 
with notice of valid agreements made by him with the 
former owner of the property, concerning the mode of 
-39­
occupation and use of the estate granted, the purchaser 
is bound in equity to fulfill such agreements 'wi th the 
original owner, because it would be unconscientious and 
inequitable for him to set aside and disregard the legal and 
valid acts and agreements of his vendor in regard to the 
:estate, of which he had notice when he became its purchaser. 
In this vievVl, the precise form or nature of the covenant or 
agreement is quite immaterial. It is not essential that it 
should run with· the land. A personal covenant or agreement 
will be held valid and binding in equity on a purchaser 
taking the estate with notice. It is not binding on him merely 
because he stands as an assignee of the party who made the 
agreement, but because he has taken the estate with notice 
of a valid agre ement concerning it, which he cannot equitably 
refuse to perform. 
The growth of cities and the more crowded conditions 
of modern life, the desire of home owners to secure desirable 
home surroundings has led to a demand for land limited 
entirely to development for residence purposes. This natural 
desire of house-holders has quite natural ly been exploited 
by realtors and land companies so that the restricted residential 
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property is now becoming the ~ule rather than the exception 
in or near our cities. The legal machinery to achieve this 
end has been found in the main not in the ancient rules of 
easements or covenants but in the activities of the court of 
equity in preventing fraud and unfair dealing. The basis of 
the modern rule rests upon the equitable doctrine of notice, 
that he who takes land with the notice of a restr iction upon 
it will not in equity and good conscience be permitted to 
act in violat ion of t h e terms of these re~trictions. 1 
There are t wo theories as to the running of equitable 
restrictions. One is that these restriction s are enforced 
as contracts concerni ng land, the second is that they are 
enforced substantially as servitudes or easements on land. 
With reference to the first theory - the contract 
which embodies the restriction is specifically enforced 
against both the promisee and those who take from him with 
notice. Those who may enforce the obligation include not 
only the promisee but those who take from him and also those 
in the neighborhood who may be considered beneficiaries of 
the contract. It also follows that there may be an action 
for damages for breach of the contract possibly in situations 
where specific performance is not possible. 
1 38 Yale Law Journal 152. 
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"It is a well ~ ettled rule that 'where land has been 
developed according to a neighborhood plan of restriction 
anyone purchasing in reliance of such restriction may sue 
anyone else in the neighborhood taking with notice, no 
matter when each purchased. So, a perior taker may sue a 
later taker and vice versa, and on division of land one may 
1 
sue another though each claim through the same original grantee." 
The first theory while supported by able juri~ts and 
text writers, presents many difficulties, both theoretical 
and practical - and these difficulties are of a serious 
nature. The contract theory is, as we know, not sufficient 
to justify the running of real covenants. The concepts of 
an agreement touching and concerning land, and of privity of 
estate were employed to justify such transfer. But with these 
equitable interests while they concern the land and run with 
it, still the requirements of real covenants are seemingly 
repudiated. The practical results of the contract theory 
may be a failure to benefit the persons whose interest should 
be protected, and a possibility of giving a right where 
none should exist. 
The other View, supported by Dean Pound and other 
earned writers, is that these restrictions be considered as 
-----_./ 
1 Tiffany 1436, 1437, Also, 21 A.L.R~ 1281, 1306, 1324. 
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servitudes upon the land similar at least to easements 

and profits. This view will be discussed more fully, and 

illustrated with decisions, in subsequent pages. 

In addition to these two aforementioned views, the 
doctrine of equitable restrictions rests also on two other 
grounds, which have been in the past strongly suggested as 
a basis for the enforcement of these restrictions; and, 
which, at the present day, exert no little force in the 
reasoning of the many leading text writers and juris ts vvho 
are occupied with pleading the cause of equitable servitudes, 
. or r4strictions. The first proposition is based on the 
argument that if the subsequent grantee were allowed to take 
the subject of the grant without the r~strictions it would 
permit an unjust enrichment on the part of such grantee, made 
possible by his being free of the restrictions, which the 
grantor had a right to enforce. It would be the case of one 
receiving something on the basis of fulfilling requirements, 
and having received, refusing to follow the agreement out of 
which he has realized benefits. 
In the case of Tulk v. Moxhay decided in 1848, which was 
the leading case on this restriction subject, the subject of 
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unjust enricbment was made the basis of the decision. In that 
case plaintiff was the owner of vacant lot and several houses 
in Leicester Square. He sold vacant piece to one Elms. 
Covenanted in deed that Elms, his heirs, and assigns would 
erect no building thereon. The property passed by several 
mesne conveyances to defendant whose deed did not contain 
the aforesaid covenant, but he had notice of said covenant. 
Defendant planned to erect a building on the lot, and plaintiff 
sought an injunction against it. An injunction was granted 
on the ground that if such a right vvere not recognized and 
enforced there would be an unjust enricp~ent at plaintiff's 
expense. In the words of the court - " •• the question is 
not ·whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a 
party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner incon­
sistent with the contract entered into by his grantor, and 
with notice of which he purchased. Of course, the price 
would be affected by the covenan~2 and nothing could be more 
inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able 
to sell the property the next day for a greater price, in 
consideration of the assignee being allowed to escape from 
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the liability which he himself had undertaken. I! l ­
At the present day courts usually pay no attention to 
the .question of unjuBt enrichment in restrictive agreement 
cases. The case of Rogers v. Hosegood (1900) is illustrative 
of this, for it was held there: that a transferee of the 
covenantor was entitled to enforce an equitable servitude 
though the plaintiff knew nothing of the restriction when he 
2bought the property from the covenantee. 
The real question involved in these early decisions was 
whether or not equitable servitudes could be enforced against 
the transfere e s of the original covenantor as well as against 
him where the former took with notice but did not covenant. 
It vvas in these early cases decided that they were enforceable 
and decisions since have substantially followed them. 
The other view to which I have reference is the one 
concerning specific performance. It is the basis upon which 
recovery is usually predicated·in these restriction cases. 
And, although not considered a separate and distinct view, 
it is nevertheless, gravitated to as a basis for the enforcibility 
of equitable servitudes. However, whether it be considered 
a distinct line of opinion or not, the fact is that in every 
cas.e where it is possible and the right to enforce restrictions 
is made clear, as a remedy, it will be eTIployed and the 
1 Tulk v. Moxhay 2 Phillips 774. 

2 Rogers v. Hosegood, 2 Ch. 388. 
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restrictive provisions enforced as agreed; rather than pursue 
a remedy at law, w"bich is oftentimes inadequate or not 
existent at all. 
The difficulty that the legal pioneers in this 
particular field of the law met was the fact that at common 
law they had no redress. It was the rigid rule of the common 
law that covenants running with the land bound only those who 
succeeded to the estate of the covenantor and could be created 
only where there was privity of estate. Further, covenants 
running with the land generally occurred in leases. The 
reason for t he early decisions vms t hat the common law was 
inadequate on t h is poin t •.• equity came to the relief of those 
thus injured under its own particular banner - tf equity will 
not suffer a vvrong to be without a remedy. If 
Referring back to bhe validity of these restrictive 
agreements it may be said that their validity has also been 
recognized and established and t heir, performance enforced 
in equity, as against subsequent purchasers with notice, 
upon the ground that SUCll stipulations create an easement or 
privilege in the land conveyed, for the use and benefit of 
the grantor, and those who might afterwards claim under him as 
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owners of adjacent land, of which the land granted originally 
formed a part. In such cases, although the covenant or agree­
ment in the deed, regarded as a contract merely, is binding 
only on the original parties, yet, in irder to carry out the 
plain intent of the parties it will be construed as creating 
a right or interest, in the nature of an incorporeal 
hereditament or easement, appurtenant to the remaining land 
belonging to the grantor, s.t the time of the grant, and arising 
out of and attached to the land, part of the original parcel, 
conveyed to the grantee. 
When, therefore, it appears by a fair interpretation 
of the wOl"ds of a grant that it was the intent of the 
parties to create or reserve a right, in the nature of a 
servitude or easement in the property granted for the benefit 
of other land owned by the grantor and originally forming 
with the land conveyed, one parcel, such right will be 
deemed appurtenant to the land of the grantor and binding on 
that conveyed to the grantee and the right and burden thus 
created will respectively pass to and be binding on all 
subsequent grantees Of . the respective lost of land. 
A court of equity will give full effect to the 
stipulation, on the complaint of a party for whose benefit 
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as owner of the land, the stipulation was intended. 
This discussion invariably leads us to one of the 
most interesting and decisive cases on this subject. The 
case of Parker v. Nitingale is unique in the force which it 
exerts in establishing the lavv on restrictive agreements or 
equ itable servitudes in this country. The estates in question 
were situated on a tlcourtrt or ltplace Tl in Boston, and con­
sisted of several dwelling-houses erected on each side of a 
"blind streetT!, or a street open only at one end. The land 
on which these had b~en erected originally b elonged to 
several heirs, who agreed between themselves that it s hould 
be laid out into a court, to be exclusively occupied by 
dwelling-houses, and that in conveying the lots the grantees 
should be laid under obligation by way of condition or 
limi tation of the use thereof, "that no other building 
excep t one of brick or stone of not less than th~ee stories 
in height, and for a dwelling-house only" , should be 
erected by them, The deeds of the lots were accordingly 
respectively made upon this condition and the sfulle vIas 
refer red to or repeated in the subsequent conveyances. 
One of the tenants of one of the houses er4cted under this 
arrangement was about to open a restaurant in the house 
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which he occupied, and the owners of the other houses 
in the court prayed an injunction to restrain him from so 
doing. 
The original ,grantors had ceased to have any interest 
in the court, and it vdll be perceived that whatever there 
was of covenant or condition in the original deeds, was 
between the grantors and grantees severally, and not 
between the several grantees, and t hat, consequently there 
was an entire want of privit7 between them, and the question 
was, if the several owners, holding by independent titles, 
could enforce against anyone of them the negative easement 
of not using the premises except as a dwelling-house. 
Bigelow, C.J., in giving the opinion of the court, 
sustaining and enforcing this easement and enjoining the 
defendant from using his house as a restaurant, proce eds 
with great clarity into the grounds upon which the decision 
rests. It is essential that we consider at length some 
of the points involved in this opinion, as they play such 
an important part in the development of this subject. 
"A court of chancery 'will recognize and enforce 
agreements concerning the occupation and mode of use of real 
estate, a lthough they are not ex'oressed with technical 
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accuracy, as exceptions or reservations out of a grant not 
binding a s covenants real running 'wi th t he land. Nor 
is it at all material t hat such stipulations should not 
be binding at law, or that any privity of , estate should 
subsist between parties in order to render t h em obligatory, 
and to warrant equitable relief in case of their infraction." 
riA covenant, though in gross at law, may nevertheless 
be binding in equity, even to the extent of fastening a 
servi tude 01'" easement on real property, or of securing to 
the owner of one parcel of land a privilege, or, as it is 
sometimes called, "a right to an amenity" in the use of an 
adjoining parcel, by which his own estate may be enhanced 
in value or rendered more agreeable as a place of residence. 1f 1 
"Restrictions and li::n.itations which may be pu t on 
property by means of such stipulations derive t heir 
validity from the right which every ovmer of the fee has to 
dispose of his estate either absolutely or by a qualified 
grant, or to regulat e t he manner in which it s hall be used 
" 2and occupied. 
"So long as he (the original purchaser) retains the 
title in himself, his covenants and agr eements r eflecting 
1 Parker v. Nitingale 6 Allan (Mass) 341. 
2 6 Allen 343. 
-50­
the use a.nd enjoyment of his estat e wil l be binding on 
him personally, and can be specifically enforced i n equity." 
"'iihen he disposes of it by grant or o therwIse, t hose 
wbo t ake under him cannot equitably refuse to ful f ill 
stipul at i ons concer ning the pr emises of which he had 
notice. It is upon this ground that cour ts of equity will 
afford relief to part ies aggrieved by t he neglect or 
omi ssion to comply wi t h agreements respec ting real estat e 
afte r it has passed by mesne conveyances out of the hands 
1
of t hose who "'were parties t o t he or i gi nal contrac t . II 
!fA purcr..aser of land, with notiee of a r i ght or 
i nt er est in it existing onl y by agr eement with his vendor, 
is bound t o do t hat which his grant or h ad agr eed to perform 
because it would be unconscientious and inequitable for 
him to disregard or violate the valid agr eements of the 
vendor in r egard to the estate of which he had notice 
when he became the purchas er. In such cases it is true 
t hat the aggrieved party can often have no r emedy at law. 
There may be neither privity of es t ate nor privity of 
1 6 Allen 343 
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contract between himself and those who attempt to appropriate 
property in contraventJ.on of the use or mode of enjoyment 
impressed upon it by the agreement of their grantor, and 
with notice of wh ich they took the estate from him. But it 
is none the less contrary to equity that those to whom the 
estate comes, with notice of the rights of another respecting 
it, whould willfully disregard them, and in the absence of any 
remedy at law the stronger is the necessity of affording in 
such cases equitable relief, if it can be given consistently 
with public policy and without violating any absolute rule 
of law." 
Chief Justice Bigelo'w notes the following cOlJl..Yr1.ent 
with interest and stresses it in the conclusion of his well 
written opinion:­
"It may be well to add that while a court of equity 
will carry into effect agreements or restrictions sifuilar 
to those set f·orth in the bill, in cases where there - is 
nothing shown to render their enforcement inequitable, 
circlLmstances may exist which mi8ht warrant a refusal to 
grant equitable relief when where it was made to appear that 
there had been a failure to use and occupy premises in 
accordance with the terms of tbB deed by which they were con­
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veyed. If, for inst anc e, it was shown th8.t one or t wo owners 
of estates insisting on the observance of restrictions contrary 
to the interes t and wishes of a large number of ovmers having 
similar rights and interests, by which great pecuniary loss 
would be inflicted upon them, or a great -public improvement 
be prevented, a court of equity might Vle ll hesitate to use its 
powers to enforce a specific perfornance or r estrain a breach 
of the restriction." 1 
In this last notation we find that equity is in full 
force in this matter of equitable restrictions. It is not 
mere interference but actual jurisdiction with a l l its wide­
spread powers, enforcing the restrictions in accordance with 
agreements and intentions, but refusing to enforce them where 
to carry out the intent would manifestly injurious to the 
interests of many and beneficial merely to a few. 
Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. presents the subject with 
much authoritative background and is, incidentally, the 
basis of the law in our state, California, on this matter. 
Time and again, California courts have cited this case and 
upheld it with a great amount of favorable comment. 
The facts in t:bis case were: Plaintiff, haVing had her 
1 Vtlb.itney v. Union Ry. Co. 77 I'JIass 359. 
-53­
land surveyed, graded ancl roads constructed, sold the same 
to one White. In the deed (duly recorded) the following 
res tr'ictions li'iTere inserted:­
"That if said Artemas White, his heirs or assigns, 
shall suffer any building to stand or be erected witbin ten 
feet of Lambert Avenue, or shall use or follow, or suffer· any 
person to use or follow, upon ahy part thereof, the business 
of a taverner, or any mec~anical or manufacturing, or any 
naseous or offensive business Whatever, then the said 
grantors, or . any person or persons hereafter, who at the 
time then being shall be a propr~etor of any lot of land ••• 
north of Lamber t Avenue, shall have the right, after sixty 
days notice thereof, to enter upon the premises with his, 
her or their servants, and forcibly, if necessary, :bo remove 
therefrom any building or buildings erected or used contrary 
to the abo'le restrictions and to abate all nulsances, 
without being liable to any damages therefor, except such 
as may be wantonly and unnecessarily done." 
Defendants acquired property t hrough mesne conveyances 
and added on the lot in question a stable, and began laying 
down rails and were proceeding to construct a turntable at 
Lambert Avenue . 
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The court held: "These restrictions, after the deed had 
been recorded, might be enforced in equity against an assignee 
1
of the grantee of the original grantoI'." 
irA restriction of the manner of using land granted, not 
against public policy, and beneficial to adjacent land of 
the grantor, whether inserted by way of condition or covenant, 
or otherwise, may be enforced in equitY',: against the grantee 
or his assigns with notice." 2 
Another interesting case which is handed down to us from 
the courts of Massachusetts, is Hubbell v. ·Warren. It was 
alleged in the bill which was to restrain defendant from 
building within less than twelve feet of the line of the 
street, that, when plair:tiff took his deed, the defendant 
orally agreed that the houses should not be built "TviJithin that 
distance fbom the street and that he, the plaintiff, had 
erected his house accordingly. 
It was held that Han agreement between the owners of 
adjacent parcels of land, restricting the mode of its use 
and enjoyment, although not entered into in the form of a 
covenant or condition, or so framed as to be binding upon 
heirs or assigns by virtue of privity of estate, may never­
theless create a right in the nature of a servitude or ease­
1 Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. 77 Mass. 359. 
2 77 Mass 363. 
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ment in the land to which it rela-':: es which can be enforced 
in equity. But to establish such servitude or easement 
it must appear, either by express stipulation 91" necessary 
or unavoidable implication, that the parties intended to impose 
a permanent restraint on the use or mode of occupation of 
1
their respective estates." 
This might be done by a condition or rese r vation incor­
porated into a grant, or appended to it as a covenant 
real, or so inserted as to carry notice to all persons 
that the use of the premises is, to a certain extent, 
qualified or limited, and the intent to create a servitude 
or privilege, in its nature perpetual, manifested. But 
Yvhere it rests in parol, or i n form of a covenant in gross, 
or by a separate independent agree~nent, it . must contain a 
stip~lation in express terms that the right or privilege is to 
be permanent restriction on the land, or such as leads to the 
conclus i on that that is the intention of the parties. 
There is a serious conflict as to whether the servitude 
should be considered as an interest in land so that a writing 
is necessary for its c r eation. Mr. Herbert Tiffany inclines 
to the view that such interests being purely equitable {and 
1 Hubbell v. 1;'la r ren, 8 Allen (Mass.) 173. 
-56­
1 
to this extent personal) need not be in writing. Yet, 
since they do affect rather substantially the land, there 
seems to be no valid reason why they are not within the policy 
2 
of the statute. 
A restriction may be implied from acts of the parties, 
such as reference to plans showing a scheme of restrictions, 
or representations of tbe owner. But the evidence of an 
intention to create a restriction must be very clear and mere 
reference to a building scheme will not compel the owner by 
its provisions witbout change. 
The contract or covenant creates an equitable interest 
in land and is within the statute of Frauds. If it is not in 
writing it will not be enforced unless there has been part 
performance, or expenditure of money on the faith of it, 
sufficient to create an estoppel. There is, however, a 
distinction between a restriction and an ordinary trust in 
regard to the statute of Frauds. In case of a trust the name 
of the cestui must be in the written instrument. This is 
because the gist of the trust is the payment of the trust fund 
to the cestui and the trust is wholly uncertain unless his 
name appears. The gist of a restriction is the doing or not 
1 2 Tiffany 1432 24 Michigan Law Review 854. 
2. Phillips v. West Rockaway Land Co. 226 N.Y. 507. 
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doing of certain acts to certain land. If the acts and the 
land are stated in writing, the court considers the statute 
satisfied, and will gather the other terms of the restriction 
by reading the writing as a whole in the light of surrounding 
circumstances. For this reason it is unnecessary that the 
wri ting should state to whom the benefit of the restriction 
shall accrue, whe ther to the covenantor personally or in 
favor of some other parcel of land. This is a question of 
fact to be determined by the intention of the vendor, and 
that question nrust be determined upon the same rules of 
evidence as any other question of intention. The ownership 
and character of buildings in the neighborhood, plans, 
building schemes, the existence of similar restriction on 
other lots, even parol agreements among neighbors, may be 
shown as bearing upon tbe probable intention of the contract­
ing paJ;'ties. 
The conclusions that these r4strictions should be tr~ated 
in substance as an easement indicates the form of language 
in which they should most properly be couched. There has, 
however, been a tendency to employ the language of contract 
or of condition. This is quite unfortunate in that both 
terms emphasize the personal nature of the interest which is 
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probably contrary to the purpose of restriction. It may 
lead to the conclusion that only the grantee is bound in 
damages and that the land itself is unrestricted. As a 
condition, a right of re-.entry will be left in the grantor 
and this will operate as a clou,d on the title. All these 
difficulties are avoided if the restriction is stated merely 
as a sel'vitude binding upon the granted land in favor of all 
other land of a certain described area. 
It is generally sufficient that the language used in the 
expression of a restriction on land, should be a clear, 
definite and understandable indication that the restriction 
is on the land, and not merely a personal covenant binding on 
the original grantee, to die when the land is removed from the 
ownership of this original grantee. 
When the restriction does become part of the land 
therefore, and binding on subsequent grantees, it is no 
objection that there was no privity of title or estate between 
the original grantor and subsequent grf\.ntees. I repeat this 
because of its importfu'1.ce as a bas is of obj Bction against 
the upholding of equitable restrictions and servitudes on 
land. Since this requirement of privity of estate, so 
important in the law of real covenants, does not apply here, 
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several learned writers have spoken in this connection, (I 
would say, quite to the pOint), of the "equitable principle 
of privity of conscience." 
tiThe action of courts of equity in such cases is not 
limited by rules of legal liability and does not depend on 
legal privity of estate, or require .that the party invoking 
the aid of the court should come in under and after the 
covenant $ A covenant or agreement restricting the use of any 
lands or tenements in favor of or on account· of other lands, 
creates an easement and makes one tenement, in the language 
of the civil law, servient, and the other dominant, and 
this without regar d to any privity or connection of title or 
estate in the two parce]:s or their owners. All that is 
necessary is a clear manif estation of the intention of the 
person who is the source of the title to subject one parcel 
of land to a restriction in its use, for the benefit of 
another, whether that other belong at the time to himself 
or to a third person, and sufficient lan~age to make that 
restriction perpetual." 1 
This leads us now up to the point - who are bound by 
equitable servitudes? It is nOD that this question has been 
neglected to be answered previously in this work, because 
1 Gilbert v. Peteler 38 Barber 488, 514. 
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it has; but the discussion is directed more to the 
necessi:by of notice and the part played by registry statutes 
in this respect. 
The benefit of equitable servitudes like other equitable 
rights may not be enforced against a bona fide purchaser. 
However, under registry statutes if the right is recorded 
it is enforceable agai~st bona fide purchasers. In this 
particular, equitable servitudes differ from common 18.w 
easements or profits which were enforceable against any 
successor in title though he paid value in good faith. In 
this regard equitable servitudes differ f:rom covenants running 
with the land which were enforceable only against those who 
succeeded to the estate of the covenantot, whereas there is 
no such limitation upon the enforcement of an equitable 
servitude. 
To illustrate this last point, in the case of Abergarw 
BreweY'Y Co. v. Holmes, the covenant in the mortgage was not 
to buy any wines, beers, etc., from anyone except the 
mortgagee; the restriction was enforced against an under­
lessee with notice, on the ground that it was the intention 
of the parties to bind everyone claiming under the mortgagor. 
1 Abergarw BreweI'Y Co. v. Holmes 1 Ch. 188 
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It has been generally held that the registry statutes 
allow and therefore require the recording of equi:table 
servitudes; and, where they are so recorded, they ar~ 
enforceable regardless of actual notice. This constitutes 
strong evidence of the force that registry statutes play in 
this matter of notice; for, ordinarily, in the absence of 
notice, a bona fide purcbaser is not bound by tbe restrictions 
on the land which he buys. Manifestly, it would be grossly 
inequitable to hold one accountable for restrictions of which 
he had no knowledge at the time he entered into the contract 
of purchase with the vendor. 
Though one who claims title from a trustee by adverse 
possession is entitled to hold it against the cestui que trust 
even if be knew of the trust, yet, an adverse user who secures 
title to property subject to an equitable servitude does not 
thereby destroy the servitude even though he had no notice 
of it. To sever the servitude it would be necessary for him 
to secure a release or to violate it and have it ou.tlawed by 
lthe running of the statute of Limitations.
It is generally said that restrictions, as the name 
implies, are limited to agreements of a negative character. 
1 In re: Nisbet and Pott's Contract 1 Ch. 386. 
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This is· not strictly true. The English cases hold directly 
that only negative restricticins wfull be enforced in equity 
and that affirmative acts will not be enforced against takers 
with notice. In the American cases there appears to be some 
yonflict with at least considerable tendency to follow the 
English rule. However, textwriters, such as Pomeroy, Clark 
and Tiffany favor enforcing both kinds of easements. 
Equity will always take jurisdiction over negative con­
tracts, for the remedy is simple - an injunction restraining 
the forbidd en act, or a mandatory injunction to undo what has 
been done in breach of the agreement. Practically all 
restrictions belong to this class. Equity will not decree 
specific performance of affirmative contracts that call for 
the exercise of skill, discretion or good faith; but when 
the required acts are of a simple nature it seems that the 
court will take jurisdiction. 
The case of Zinn v. Sidler presents a point of 
interest in the follo wing words: "Restrictive covenants 
lessen the fee and are not favored in law. They should 
therefore be made manifest in no uncertain manner and not be 
1 
left 	entirely to implication." 
In Tallmadge v. The East River Bank, a New York case, 
1 Zinn v. Sidler 187 ~V . 1172. 
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the facts were: It was an action to restrain defendant who 
owned a corner on 8th street and Third Avenue, New York 
City, from erecting a building thereon covering the whole 
lot, and to require them to leave a space of eight feet 
between the bullding and the line of the street in conformity 
to the plan adopted by the original owner of the tpact who 
in selling the other lots exhibited the plans showing the 
eight foot set-back and stating that it was his plan to so 
build on all of the tract. The lower court found that 
defendants bought with notice of this restriction inasmuch 
as they were told that they would not be able to build 
eight feet of the lot designated in a mesne conveyance as 
a courtyard. But the deeds of the vendor to these defendants 
were absolute and unrestricted. 
It was held that lithe owner of land may, by parol 
contract with the -ourchaseps of successive parcels in 
respect to the manner of its improvements and occupation 
affect the remaining parcels with an equity requiring them 
also to be occupied in conformity to the general plan, 
which is binding upon a subsequent purchaser with notice of 
the fact, though his legal title be absolute and unrestricted. "I 
1 Tallmadge v. East River Bank 26 N.Y. 105. 
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An owner of land may restrict land for his own 
personal advantage; or he may secure it for himself as Dwner 
of the land, in which case it descends to each owner of the 
land. Again, he may seek to benefit a grantee to whom he 
has already conveyed land.. But the most freque!1t case ia. 
when he sells land, laid out in lots, subject to a_general 
restriction. Most of the decisions rendered on the subject 
of equitable easements are concerned particularly with circma­
stances surrounding subdivisions and the restrictions attached 
to building on lots sold with the one main tract. California 
courts have presented some very interesting and l~ading cases 
in this respect; we will discuss them shortly. 
The rest to which the benefit and buden of restrictive 
agreements attach, is commonly land. But it may be personal 
property. In the familiar case of the sale of a business 
with an agreement by the seller not to engage in the same 
business within a certain distance, the benefit of the 
agreement passes to a subsequent assignee of the businesse 
In Murphy' v. GhristianPress Association Publishing Co., 
the facts showed that a corporation owning the copyright 
of a prayer book sold a set of plates and authorized the 
vendees, subject to certain restrictions, to publish the 
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work from that set of plates, covenanting that it would not 
sell a set of plates to any other publisher without the 
consent of the vendees - the agreement contained a provision 
that the retail price for plainly bound copies should be $1.25 
and fixed the discounts to be allowed to the trade. Subsequent­
ly a receiver of the corporation sold t h e remaining sets 
of plates and the copyright of the prayer book to a company 
having full notice of such agreement and the latter proceeded 
to pubiliish from t he plates a finer book at a price less than 
that fixed in the agreement between the vendor and the first 
vendees. 
Held: liThe agreement by the vendor, though technically 
a personal one, i mposed an obligation upon all who acquired 
the plates with notice of such agreement and t he first 
vendees were entitled to an injunction restraining the 
second vendee from selling its publications at less than 
the stipulated price." 
The weight of authority supporting the American 
doctrine of equitable easements, as based on the decisions 
of Massachusetts' courts, is mirrored in California 
i D the case of Werner v. Graham. This decis i on consti t utes 
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the leading case in this state on land restrictions; and, 
it is to this that we now turn our consideration. 
One Mar shall, the owner of the whole tract, in 1902 
subdivided it into blocks and lots, and recorded a map of 
the subdivision. After the recordation of the map, he 
began selling and conveying the lots. In all of the deeds 
from Marshall appear restrictive provisions which, while 
differing slightly in some instances, depend ent upon the 
location of the particular lot, as, for instance, upon its 
facing east or west, are yet so uniform and consistent in 
character as to indicate umr1istakably that Marshall had in 
mind a general and common plan which he was follovdng. The 
restrictions in the deed by Marshall conveying the plaintiff's 
lot are typical and read:- "Provided, however, that this 
conveyance is made upon and shall be subject to tIle following 
express conditions, to-wit: That no building to be used 
as a saloon, or tenement houses known as flats, or livery 
stable, or store of any kind or nature whatever shall be 
erected or placed on said premises or any part thereof, nor 
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shall any such business be conducted on said premises or any . 
part thereof at any time within 30 years from the date 
hereof; that no derrick for boring any oil well shall be 
er4cted or placed, nor shall oil be produced in any manner 
whatsoever, on said premises or any part thereof at any time 
within 50 years from the date hereof; and also that any 
buildings to be used as dwelling-houses which may be erected 
or placed upon said premises or any part thereof at any time 
within 25 years from the date hereof, shall be located and 
placed as follows: ••• and the reasonable cost thereof shall 
not be less than $3000; and said dwelling and its appurtenances 
shall not be located less than 40 feet from the front property 
line of the premises; and not more than one house and its 
appurtenances shall be built or placed on each lot herein 
conveyed. If the said party of the second part, his heirs 
or assigns or successors in estate, shall in any way fail 
to keep or perform the conditions above specified, or any 
one of them in any respect whatsoever, then any and all right, 
title, interest and estate hereby granted or conveyed shall 
revert to and become vested in the said parties of the first 
part, their heirs or assigns." "That said party of the second 
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part accepts this deed and conveyance upon and subject to 
each and all of the said conditions herein set forth. It 
is further understood and agreed that each and all of said 
conditions and covenants shall run with said premises and 
shall be binding upon the heirs, assigns and all successors 
1in estate of the said party of the second part." 
This action is to quiet title to real property, the 
purpose being to obtain a judicial determination that the 
land of the plaintiff is free of these restrictions as to 
its use. 
Neither the plaintiff nor any of the defendants were 
original parties to the covenants - there exists no privity 
of contract between them. The plaintiff does not hold under 
or through any of the defendants, nor any of them under or 
through him. It follows that the covenants are not covenants 
recognized by the common law as running with the land, 
such as covenants between lessor and lessee, or between 
grantor and grantee for the benefit of the estate conveyed. 
Furthermore, the covenants here involved are manifestly not 
for the benefit of the estate conveyed, but to its 
detriment. 
If then these covenants are to be given force, as 
1 Y{erner v. Graham 181 Cal. 174, 177, 178 
-69­
--------------------------~ 
between the plaintiff 8.nd defendants, it clearly must be 
because: (a) The burden imposed by them was one upon the 
land conveyed and incident to its ownership, so that the 
plaintiff when he acquired his lot, acquired it subject 
to such burden; and (b) the benefit of the covenants 
was an incident of the ownership of the other lots in the 
tract, so that when Marshall parted with them the benefit 
of the covenants passed with them as an incident of their 
ownership and the defendants are now entitled to such 
benefit as the present owners of the lots In other words, 
in order that the covenants have force, not merely as between 
the original parties, but as ~etween the plaintiff and the 
defendants, it nnlst appear that their insertion in the deed 
by Marshall, was in effect the c eation of what amounts to a 
servitude, to the burden of which the plaintiff's lot was 
subjected as the servient tenemell~, o.no to the benefit of 
which the remainder of the tract was entitled as the 
dominant tenement. 
"The enforceuien"t of cov8I",ants restricting the use of 
one parcel of land for th e benefit of another parcel, 
not merely as between the original parties, but as between 
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the original parties, but as between their respective grantees 
betvleen whom privity of estate or of contract can p:coperly be 
said to exist., originated at a compar8.t.ively recent date in 
• 
the chancery courts and appa.rently without a clear 
appreciation of the fact that the enforcement of such 
covenants for and against grantees of tbe original parties 
was, in effect, the creating of seI>vituo.e. Such s 8rvit'url s;;" 
2.re frequently spoken of as "equitable easements". They 
were unknown to the c OTomon law and are no t among the 
servitudes enumerated by our code. (Civil Code 801,802. ) " 1 
"They are opposed to the rule that the owner of land 
may not create new and heretofore unknown estates, and while 
their validity, that is, the enforceable character of such 
covenants as against grantees of the original parties ­
is now too well established to admit of question, it has 
resulted that the covenants which will be enforced are 
limited to those which dil~ectly concern and benefit what we 
may term the dominant tenement, and also, that any prov isions 
of an instrument creating or claimed to create such a 
servitude will be strictly construed, any doubt being 
2
resolved in favor of the free use of t he land." 
1 181 Cal. 180. 
.~ 2 • 181 Cal. 181. 
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"A servitude running with the land in favor of one 
parcel and against another is not created where the owner 
of the tract sells a portion of it, exacting of the 
grantee restrictive provisions as to its use, but without 
a word indicating that the land conveyed is a part of a 
larger tract, the balance of which the grantor still 
retains, or that the restrictions are intended for the 
benefit of other lands, o"r that there benefit is to inure 
to or pass with other lands, and without any description or 
designation of the land which is to be the dominant 
tenement." Hence, there was no easement here. 
IIWhen the owner of a subdivided tract conveys that 
various parcels in the tract by deeds containing appropriate 
language imposing restl' ictions on each parcel as part of a 
general plan of restricti.ons common to all the parcels and 
designed for their mutual benefit, mutual equitable servitudes 
are thereby created in favor of each parcel as against all 
others, for the agreement between the grantor and each 
grantee in such case as expressed in the instruments 
between them is both the parcel conveyed shall be subject 
to restrictions in accordance with the plan for the benefit 
of all the other parcels and also that all other parcels shall 
1 
be subject to such restrictions for its benefit." 
"It is not the grantor's intent alone that governs, but 
the joint intent of himself and his grantees, and such 
intent must be expressed in the instruments which constitute 
2the final memorials of their understanding." 
other cases to the same effect are Firth v. Marovich, 
160 Cal. 257; Los Angeles Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36; Long v. 
Crmner Co., 155 Cal. 402. 
The Werner v. Grahrua case is important and is 
indeed an esseDtial decision i n the establishment of tIle 
equitable easement theory in California. The whole 
discussion in that case may, hoYvever, be surmned up in the 
simple statement that ~ the parties desire to create mutual 
rights in real property of the character claimed in this 
case, they must say so, and must say it in the only place 
where it can be given legal effect, namely, in the written 
i nstruments exchanged between them which constitute the 
final expression of their und erstanding. It is the 
existence of the mutual intent to restrict for the benefit 
of other parcels - and this ' must be shown clearly. It was 
the absence of this qualification that defeated the 
restrictive covenants in the Grahrua case. 
1 181 Cal. 184. 

2 181 Cal. 184, 185. 
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It has been said previously in this work, that 
there has been no explosive change in the law of easements, 
either legal or equitable, as it passed through different 
periods of legal history. The few changes suffered, have 
been gradual and comparatively proportionate. The law in 
this respect is still in its infancy. It is, however, 
the regret of the author, that owing to the nature of this 
work, he cannot speculate on the future of this subject. 
But, as the demand for highly restricted residential districts 
grows (as 'it is now doing with incres.sing force), so shall 
this phase of the law have to grow. And it will be in this 
growth that the greatest changes in the law of easements 
will take place. These will be quick changes; still 
proportionate, but answering the crying need of the populace 
for freedom from the unquiet! 
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